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Will the Supreme Court Finally Eliminate
ERISA Preemption?
David L. Trueman, JD., Ph.D.
The ability to hold a managed care entity responsible for its actions,
particularly for the decisions it makes in the utilization review process, has
historically been hampered by preemption provisions of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Over the past year and
a half, a number of federal courts have decided that ERISA does not
preempt allegations that a managed care entity failed to approve the care a
patient's doctor recommended thereby resulting in injury or death. Conflict
among the federal circuits regarding this doctrine has recently arisen and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorarito two cases from Texas
to clarify ERISA preemption. However, because the cases the Court chose
do not address both of the major aspects of ERISA preemption, it is unclear
whether the Court will finally put to rest questions regarding the
applicability of ERISA to state law tort claims in relation to utilization
review determinations.
The issue of preemption is dramatic, often involving life-and-death
addressing the question of who has control over medical decisionand
cases
making. Patients claim that health insurance companies intrude into the
sphere of the physician-patient relationship and mandate medical care,
which is often contrary to what the treating doctor has recommended. As a
result, injured patients or their families file claims in state court for
negligence and medical malpractice against the health insurance companies.
Health insurance companies insist that Congress provided protection for the
managed care enterprise by making ERISA the exclusive remedy for plan
beneficiaries, only allowing for contract-like benefit claims and not for
personal injury and wrongful death tort suits. Recent decisions, including a
seminal Supreme Court decision, have cast doubt on ERISA preemption
and what has served for almost two decades as an insulation from liability
for managed care organizations. Now, finally, the Supreme Court may
decide the issue.
This article will examine the Supreme Court case that articulated a new
ERISA jurisprudence and formed the basis for courts to alter their
preemption analysis. Next, cases will be presented which have considered
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this issue, and the author will speculate on how the Court will rule on the
cases under its review. Finally, there will be a consideration of which state
law claims may be viable and the available defenses should the Supreme
Court limit or eliminate preemption.
I. THE IMPACT OF ERISA ON CLAIMS AGAINST
MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS

A. ERISA: Basic Principles
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act is a comprehensive
statute originally enacted in 1974 to protect beneficiaries' pension plans;
however, Congress included welfare benefit plans under ERISA and thus it
applies to health benefits plans. Two ERISA provisions are relevant for
claims against health care plans. First, section 502(a) of the Act applies to
benefit determinations and provides federal courts with complete
jurisdiction over any claim regarding a failure to provide benefits,
regardless of how it is pled.'
This provision has historically been
determined as indicating that any state law tort claim alleging wrongful
denial of care due to a managed care organization's utilization review
determinations falls under federal jurisdiction. Once in federal court,
section 514 has traditionally provided a defense against claims by plaintiffs
resulting in dismissal of their actions.2
B. ERISA Section 502(a)
1. Claims for Wrongful Denials of Benefits
Section 502(a) provides the exclusive remedy for beneficiaries seeking
relief pertaining to the provision of benefits.3 Under section 502(a)(1)(B), a
civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover
benefits due to him under the terms of this plan, to enforce his rights under
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan.4
Section 502 limits the relief available to plan participants to obtaining
their benefits by either enjoining the Health Maintenance Organization
1. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000). See also 29 U.S.C.A. § I132(a) (West 2003). [Editor's
Note: 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c)(3)-(4) was recently amended. See P.L. 108-218, Title I, §§
102(d), 103(b), 104(a)(2), 118 Stat. 602, 603, 606 (Apr. 10, 2004)].
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
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(HMO) from continuing a violative practice or obtaining an equitable
remedy. 5 This section precludes punitive damages, as well as "make
6
whole" damages for injuries resulting from denied treatment. For example,
if an HMO refuses to pay for a needed test, the damages will likely be
limited to the cost of the test. Thus, if a company refuses to pay for
treatment which a patient's doctor recommends, and even if the denial was
egregious and the patient died, the decedent's estate or family would
receive nothing. Due to what has been determined as ERISA's "complete
preemption ' 7 of all claims for health care benefits, the fact that a plaintiff
will have no remedy does not affect ERISA supersession of state law.
2. The Well Pleaded Complaint Rule and Complete Preemption
The "well pleaded complaint rule," as stated by the Supreme Court,
provides that a civil action falls within federal jurisdiction only when a
federal question, "arising under" federal law, appears on the face of the
8
A defendant cannot convert a
plaintiffs properly pleaded complaint.
merely by asserting a defense
action
federal
a
plaintiff's state law claim into
impliedly provided by the federal statute, "even if the defense is anticipated
in the plaintiffs complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense
is the only question truly at issue." 9 Since preemption defenses available to
the defendant under the federal laws would not be pleaded on the face of the
plaintiffs complaint, the cause of action could not be removed to a federal
court.10
"Complete preemption" is an exception to the "well pleaded complaint
Complete preemption occurs when Congress "so completely
rule."
preempts a particular area [of law] that any civil complaint raising this
select group of claims is necessarily federal in character."" If complete
preemption is implicated, a defendant converts a plaintiffs state law claim
into a federal question merely by utilizing the defense. ERISA section 502
triggers complete preemption regardless of whether the plaintiff pleads the
section or alleges anything implicating a denial of benefits.
The availability of complete preemption under ERISA has generally
been attributed to two Supreme Court rulings. In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, which related to a disability claim in which the condition of the
5. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
7. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987)
8. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (citing
Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75-76 (1914)).
9. Id. at 14.
10. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 481 U.S. at 63.
11. Id. at 63-64.

Published by LAW eCommons, 2004

3

430

Annals of Health Law, Vol. 13 [2004], Iss. 2, Art. 6

Annals of Health Law

[Vol. 13

beneficiary was not at issue, the Court decided that the state causes of
action asserting improper processing of claims under the insured employee
benefit plans were preempted by ERISA.12 The Court stated that ERISA
was designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries
by regulating the creation and administration of employee benefit plans.1 3
To wit, Congress clearly intended that ERISA be "the exclusive vehicle for
actions by ERISA plan participants.. . asserting improper [claim]
processing," and that individual state laws should not impede Congress's
purposes and objectives.' 4
The second of the two Supreme Court rulings establishing the
availability of complete preemption under ERISA is the Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Russell 15 decision. In that case, the Court
determined that ERISA does not create compensatory or punitive damages
remedies where an administrator of a plan fails to provide the benefits due
under the plan.16
With the Pilot's Life and Massachusetts Mutual decisions as a
foundation, federal courts have routinely ruled that claims alleging
wrongful denials of care are attacks on the mechanism by which benefits
are administered and should be preempted and dismissed as attempts to
improperly obtain a remedy.' 7 Even sympathetic judges have felt
12. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 43 (1987).
13. Id. at 54.
14. Id. at 52.
15. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
16. Id. at 146.
17. D. L. Trueman, Managed Care Liability Today: Laws, Cases, Theories, and Current
Issues, 33 J. HEALTH L. 191, 199 (2000). Also see the following Circuit Court rulings: Hull
v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939, 943 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the claim for "medical
malpractice" for the HMO's failure to approve the decedent-patient's physicianrecommended stress test was preempted because the claim could have been brought under
ERISA section 502(a)); Danca v. Private Health Care Sys., Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 1999)
(holding ERISA preempted claims of inappropriate psychiatric hospitalization resulting in
patient's attempted suicide and self-immolation); Tolton v. Am. Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937,
942 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that because plaintiff's claims arose from the ERISA health
plan's refusal to authorize benefits under the plan, the claims were "clearly 'relat[ed] to' the
benefit plan," and were therefore preempted); Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88
F.3d 1482, 1488 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding plaintiff cannot transform a claim for denial of
benefits under ERISA into a state law claim by alleging that a utilization review agent
negligently denied physical rehabilitation); Spain v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 11 F.3d 129, 131
(9th Cir. 1993) (holding that ERISA preempted wrongful death claim based on withdrawal
of authorization for surgery); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999
F.2d 298, 303 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that an HMO's "cancellation" of surgery was a
"decision not to precertify payment [which] relates directly" to benefit administration);
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that
ERISA preempted claims for failure to authorize hospitalization that led to the death of the
plaintiffs newborn).
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constrained by ERISA and the rulings of the Supreme Court. For example,
in Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers, the plaintiffs husband committed suicide
by carbon monoxide poisoning after repeatedly having been denied covered8
psychiatric hospitalization for substance abuse and attempted suicide.'
Even a court-ordered hospitalization was refused by the managed care
organization and the decedent was taken to a correctional facility instead
19 Judge Young considered Mrs.
where ultimately he was sodomized.
Andrews-Clarke's breach of contract claim as a right "predating the Magna
Carta" and stated that the right to have contractual promises enforced "is the
bedrock of our notion of individual autonomy and property rights... which
2°
However, he
has been zealously guarded by the state judiciary."
contended that because of the Pilot Life ruling and ERISA section 502(a),
the court had "no choice but to pluck Diane Andrews-Clarke's case out of
to
the state courts... and then, at the behest of Travelers and Greenspring,
21
remedy.,
a
without
her
leave
and
face
her
slam the courthouse doors in
3. Vicarious Liability Claims and Section 502(a)
In contrast to the preemption of claims that raise questions of benefit
rights or approval of treatment, allegations that a plan is vicariously liable
for its medical personnel's negligent conduct or malpractice have, in the
past few years, avoided removal to federal court pursuant to section
502(a). The seminal case standing for the proposition that ERISA section
18. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 51-52 (D. Mass. 1997).
19. Id. at 51-52.
20. Id. at 52-53.
21. Id. at 53.
22. See, e.g., Rice v. Panchal, 65 F. 3d 637, 646 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's
vicarious liability claim against HMO based on doctors' malpractice raised state tort claim
issues and was not preempted by ERISA nor removable to federal court); Pacificare of Okla.
v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that "[j]ust as ERISA does not
preempt the malpractice claim against a doctor, it should not preempt the vicarious liability
claim against the HMO"); Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atl. States, Inc.,
958 F. Supp. 1137, 1149 (E.D. Va. 1997) (holding that ERISA does not preempt professional
malpractice claims); Edelen v. Osterman, 943 F. Supp. 75, 77 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that a
medical malpractice claim against a treating medical provider at an HMO was not
preempted); Fritts v. Khoury, 933 F. Supp. 668, 671 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that
plaintiff's action for wrongful death of her sons was not preempted by ERISA because she
did not allege improper denial or refusal of benefits, and did not seek clarification of future
benefits under the plan); Prihoda v. Shpritz, 914 F. Supp. 113, 117 (D. Md. 1996) (holding
that where the claims involved the quality of services provided, as opposed to whether
benefits were provided under the plan, ERISA did not preempt vicarious liability claims
against the HMO); Schacter v. Pacificare of Okla., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1448, 1451 (N.D. Okla.
1995) (holding that ERISA did not preempt vicarious liability/ostensible agency claim
against HMO where the underlying claim was malpractice); Haas v. Group Health Plan, Inc.,
875 F. Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Ill. 1994) (holding that vicarious liability claim against HMO
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502 does not allow a federal court to have jurisdiction over a plaintiffs
vicarious liability claim against a managed care organization is Dukes v.
U.S. Healthcare. In Dukes, the plaintiffs husband died because the plan
physician and hospital failed to conduct necessary blood tests to diagnose
what ultimately was a fatal condition.2 4 The plaintiff sued the physician for
malpractice and the HMO for vicarious liability for the conduct of its plan
physician.2 5 The Third Circuit ruled that there was a distinction between
claims pertaining to the "quality" of plan benefits or the quality of the
medical care provided, and those involving the "quantity" of benefits,
which include administrative determinations of benefits.26 The court held
that because the "plaintiffs here simply do not claim that the plans
erroneously withheld benefits due," the claims were not encompassed
within section 502(a)(1)(B) and the case was not removable to federal
court. 27 Notably, the Dukes court held that claims asserting wrongful
denials of benefits in the utilization review process should be preempted,
yet vicarious liability claims based on medical malpractice should not be
subject to preemption.28
This line of reasoning is important, as well, for claims that allege that
wrongful denials of physician-recommended care led to injuries or death of
for doctor's malpractice was not preempted by ERISA); Dearmas v. Av-Med, Inc., 865 F.
Supp. 816, 818 (S. D. Fla. 1994) (holding that ERISA did not preempt a claim alleging that
the HMO is vicariously liable for its treating physician's actions); Kearney v. U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 859 F. Supp. 182, 188 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that ERISA preempted
plaintiffs' direct negligence claims against HMO but not vicarious liability claims based on
physician's malpractice); Elesser v. Hosp. of the Phila. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 802 F.
Supp. 1286, 1290 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (holding that ERISA did not preempt claim against an
HMO for negligent hiring and retention of plaintiff's primary care physician); Independence
HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F. Supp. 983, 988 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that ERISA did not bar
an action against an HMO for a physician's malpractice based on an "ostensible agency"
theory); McClellan v. Health Maint. Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1063 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(holding that suit based on liability of HMO for negligence of agent-physician and on
intentional misrepresentation or fraud by HMO itself not preempted by ERISA).
23. 57 F.3d 350 (3rd Cir. 1995).
24. Id. at 352.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 357.
27. Id. at 356.
28. For a holding that the vicarious liability claim was not preempted, see supra note 22;
cf. Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482, 1488 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
vicarious liability claims against and HMO based on a plan physician's malpractice were
preempted by ERISA because, but for the plan, the HMO would not have formed a
relationship with the physician, and plaintiff would not have sought the physician's
services). Therefore, the court held, the negligence claim was "directly 'related to' the
[p]lan." Id. Butler v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125, 120 (D. N.J. 1994) (holding that vicarious
liability claims for negligent supervision were preempted by ERISA because HMO acted
more as an insurer rather than health care service provider).

http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol13/iss2/6

6

2004]

Trueman: Will the Supreme Court Finally Eliminate ERISA Preemption?

ERISA Preemption

the patient. If a plaintiff can successfully contend that the utilization review
determination was medical in nature then it may successfully avoid
preemption due to the "quality" of the care at issue.
C. ERISA Section 514
The second type of ERISA preemption, section 514, is a "general
preemption" or "conflict preemption" provision which provides a defense
against claims or laws which "relate to" an ERISA plan. In pertinent part,
the provisions of section 514 supercede any state laws that pertain to any
employee benefit plan.29 Section 514 also provides that certain state laws
will be saved from preemption by the "saving clause" which states that
nothing in the subchapter "shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities., 30 This language is then limited by the "deemer clause," which
provides that plans which self-insure are not considered insurance
companies. 3 However, questions of the saving and deemer clauses are
generally reserved for claims that a state statute should be invalidated
because of ERISA supersession and these issues typically do not arise in
32
relation to claims for wrongful denial of treatment.
Initially, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted section 514 expansively,
33
Indirect claims or laws
permitting preemption of almost all claims.
having only a tangential relationship to an ERISA plan were invalidated.
Recently, however, the Court has narrowed the boundaries of the
preemptive scope of section 514, recognizing the almost indefinable reach
of its prior expansive reading. The Court stated that previous attempts to
clarify the meaning of "relates to" in section 514 had been "less than
in its
helpful" and that the phrase "relates to" should be interpreted
sense. 34
expansive
infinitely
its
in
than
rather
sense
"limiting"
In California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham
Construction N.A., Inc., the Supreme Court further limited the expansive
29.
30.

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).

31.

29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).

32. See, e.g., Fox v. General Motors Corp., 859 F. Supp. 216, 218 (S.D.W.V. 1994)
(holding that state law is preempted by ERISA to the extent that the state law relates to any
employee benefit plan).
33. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1983) (stating that Congress used
the words "relate to" in section 514(a) in a very broad sense in order to eliminate the threat
of conflicting or inconsistent State and local regulation of employee benefit plans and
therefore determining that any law that had a connection with or reference to an employee
benefit plan was subject to preemption).
34. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 656 (1995).
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reading of "relates to" so that it would not implicate any possible claim that
conceivably could make reference to or have a connection with the plan.35
The Dillingham court clarified that the appropriate inquiry is whether the
state law in question applies equally to non-ERISA entities as it does to
ERISA entities, that is whether the statute in question is a law of general
applicability and not one which only affects ERISA plans.36
In De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund the
Supreme Court considered a New York tax levied on hospitals, most of
which were not owned or operated by ERISA funds, and further limited the
interpretation of "relates to."' 37 Although the tax at issue in De Buono
literally "related to" an ERISA plan, it did not refer exclusively to ERISA
plans and, thus, did not "make reference to" the plan within the Dillingham
definition.3 8 The Court stated although a state law may have some effect on
the administration of ERISA plans, not every state law with such an effect
may be preempted by the federal statute.39
Accordingly, section 514 is limited and will not be available to a
defendant unless there is federal jurisdiction over the case. Therefore, if a
federal court to which the claim has been removed does not find that section
502(a) completely preempted the state law, the court cannot rule on the
substantive nature of the claim. If this is the case, section 502(a) will not
affect the suit and the only question is whether section 514 will serve as a
defense. However, any comprehensive ruling on ERISA preemption must
encompass both sections 502(a) and 514.
II. PEGRAM V. HERDRICH: THE SUPREME COURT PAVES THE
WAY FOR A NEW ERISA JURISPRUDENCE
A. Pegram Identifies a New Categoryfor UtilizationReview Decisions
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Pegram v. Herdrich paved the
way for a new line of ERISA jurisprudence, narrowing ERISA preemption
by identifying a new category for utilization decisions which could avoid
preemption. In Pegram, the Supreme Court started down the path of
eliminating ERISA preemption for claims alleging injuries resulting from
wrongful denials or delays of treatment but only when a patient's symptoms
are included in the process of making a pre-certification or utilization

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

519 U.S. 316, 324 (1997).
Id.
520 U.S. 806, 816 (1997).
Id.at 815-16.
Id.at 816.
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review determination. 40 Although Pegram examined fiduciary duties owed
to ERISA plan beneficiaries, the Court fashioned an opinion that extended
well beyond the fiduciary duty issue into the arena of utilization review and
medical determinations of requests for treatment.
In Pegram, Cynthia Herdrich's appendix ruptured after waiting eight
days for her physician, Lori Pegram, M.D., an employee of Carle Clinic
Association, to authorize a diagnostic procedure. 41 The plaintiff sued Dr.
Pegram and Carle Clinic in state court for medical malpractice and two
counts of fraud.42 Dr. Pegram and Carle Clinic alleged that ERISA
preempted the fraud counts and accordingly, removed the case to a federal
district court. 3 The district court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on one of the fraud counts, but allowed Ms. Herdrich to
amend the remaining count.
Ms. Herdrich's amended complaint alleged that the HMO breached its
fiduciary duty under ERISA by rewarding financial incentives to its
physicians to limit medical care, rather than creating incentives that benefit
the plan participants, like Ms. Herdrich. 44 The district court dismissed the
remaining fraud claim stating that Carle Clinic was not an ERISA fiduciary
and that Ms. Herdrich failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted. 45 Although Ms. Herdrich prevailed on her medical malpractice
counts, she appealed the district court's dismissal of her ERISA claims. On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed and held that Carle Clinic was acting
as a fiduciary when its physicians made the decision to prolong diagnostic
procedures.4 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.4 7
Although breach of fiduciary duty was the issue, the Court's discussion
of HMOs and their capitated gatekeeper physicians is of far-reaching
importance. The Supreme Court first determined whether Carle Clinic,
functionally an HMO, owed fiduciary duties to Ms. Herdrich when it acted
through it physicians. 48 The court stated that a fiduciary under ERISA is
someone acting as a manager, administrator, or financial advisor to a plan,
in this case Ms. Herdrich's State Farm medical plan. 49 The plaintiff claimed
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

530 U.S. 211 (2000).
Id. at215-16.
Id. at 215.
Id. at215-16.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 217.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 217.

47.

Id. at218

48.
49.

Id.
Id. at 222 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(i)-(iii) (2000)).
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that Carle Clinic had a fiduciary obligation to her because Carle Clinic was
the administrator of the State Farm medical plan.5 °
Similar to the responsibilities of a common law trustee, a fiduciary has a
duty to act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.'
However, unlike a common law trustee with duties only to the beneficiary,
an ERISA fiduciary often wears many hats, sometimes with duties to the
plan participant and beneficiaries and other times with duties to the
employer -and plan sponsors.5 2
Health Maintenance Organization
physicians act as administrators when they determine whether a patient's
condition is covered, yet also act as health care providers when they decide
53
on the type of medical treatment the patient will receive.
The Court recognized that HMOs take steps to control costs, and usually
employ utilization review, where treatment decisions are made by a
"decisionmaker" rather than by the treating physician. 54 Physicians will
often receive financial incentives for decreasing utilization of health
services, thus, "in an HMO system, a physician's financial interest lies in
providing less care, not more. 55 Ms. Herdrich argued that Carle Clinic's
physicians received a year-end bonus based on the profitability of Carle
Clinic, and the physicians therefore had an incentive to minimize the use of
certain costly services, such as diagnostic tests. 6 Ms. Herdrich therefore
complained that Carle Clinic, as the fiduciary administrator of the medical
plan, breached its fiduciary duty to her because Carle Clinic did not act in
Ms. Herdrich's best interests.57
The Court, however, delineated different types of decisions made by
Carle Clinic's physicians. Some types of "eligibility decisions" gave rise to
fiduciary duties as the administrator of the plan, while other types of
"treatment decisions" were outside the fiduciary's obligations. The Court
recognized that "eligibility decisions" include determinations of whether a
plan covers a particular medical condition or procedure for treatment. 58
These administrative decisions would give rise to a fiduciary obligation
under ERISA. "Treatment decisions," on the other hand, involve choices
about how to diagnose and treat the patient's condition and would not give

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 227.
Id. at 223-24.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 225.
Id.
Id. at. 219.
Id
Id. at216, n.3.
Id.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 228.
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rise to obligations as a fiduciary under ERISA.59 In reality, however, these
decisions are often inseparable since there is rarely a pure "eligibility"
question, such as whether an appendicitis is covered under the plan.60
The Pegram court ruled that Dr. Pegram's decisions and medical
judgments entailed a "mixed eligibility and treatment decision., 61 The
physician's decisions about when to use diagnostic tests, decisions about
whether to refer a patient to another physician or facility, and conclusions
about standards of care, reasonableness of treatment, and the emergency
character of a condition, were all mixed eligibility and treatment
decisions. 62 As such, these decisions and determinations fell outside any
fiduciary duties owed by Carle Clinic, functioning as an HMO and plan
administrator, to a plan participant under ERISA.63 The Court doubted that
Congress intended mixed eligibility decisions to be fiduciary in nature. 64
When creating fiduciary obligations under ERISA, Congress focused on
the fiduciaries' financial decisions, primarily in pension plans and
"financial mismanagement that had too often deprived employees of their
benefits. 65 Congress's focus was not directed toward the kind of fiduciary
obligations Ms. Herdrich complained Carle Clinic owed to her. 66 The
Pegram court ultimately held that mixed eligibility decisions by Carle
Clinic physicians were not fiduciary decisions under ERISA, and therefore
Ms. Herdrich's ERISA count failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted.67
The distinction between "pure eligibility decisions" and "mixed
eligibility and treatment decisions" is critical for developing a meaningful
section 502(a) jurisprudence regarding the regulation of the administration
of benefits. Section 502(a) governs claims seeking to (1) recover plan
benefits due under the terms of the plan, (2) enforce rights under the terms
of the plan, or (3) clarify the right to future benefits due under the terms of
the plan.68 Such a structure makes sense in the pension and disability
context, such as in Pilot Life, where there is often no question regarding the
insured's medical condition and the only issue is whether money is due.69

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Id. at 229-30.
Id. at 231.
Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231.
Id. at 232.
Id.
Id. at 237.
29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B).
See Pilot Life Ins., v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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Viewed from this perspective, the new jurisprudence recognizes that certain
benefits, such as pension and disability, are subsumed under the category of
pure eligibility determinations pursuant to section 502(a) and that decisions
that include medical determinations are qualitatively distinct.
Pegram and its new jurisprudence now seem to make sense of ERISA, a
law enacted with the purpose of protecting insureds within the pension
context, thus necessitating the statute's title, "Employee Retirement and
Income Security Act." Commentators have uniformly contended that
managed care and HMO decisions regarding the medical necessity or
experimental nature of a patient's treatment could not have been entertained
by Congress, were not intended to be covered under ERISA, and do not
logically intersect with section 502(a).70 Indeed, the Supreme Court stated
as much when it doubted that "Congress would ever have thought of a
mixed eligibility decision as fiduciary in nature. 71 The Pegram ruling
seems to recognize Congress's intent in enacting section 502(a) of
ERISA.72
Interpreted in this manner, Pegram has clarified benefit or administrative
decisions, which the Court bifurcated into "pure eligibility" and "mixed
eligibility and treatment" categories. This effectively reverses the Court's
practice of subsuming medical review requests for care under the broad
category of "administration" and the rule that any medical decision in
furtherance of an insurance determination is merely administrative. It also
eliminates the simplistic quantity versus quality dichotomy set forth in
Dukes, which failed to highlight the medical nature of utilization review
determinations and replaces it with a mechanism that addresses the nature
of the health care system today, as one which has different individuals
making decisions and multiple entities providing care and services to
patients.
B. Pegram Should Apply to All Mixed Eligibility and Treatment Decisions
Regardless of the Entity Making Those Decisions
An issue that repeatedly arises is whether the Supreme Court's opinion in
Pegram should be limited and apply only to the facts at issue in that case. A
narrow interpretation would limit the Pegram jurisprudence to cases
involving capitated physician groups where a treating physician made a
gatekeeping determination surrounding the physician's treatment of a

70. Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed Care Torts:
Achieving Fairnessand Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence,35 Hous. L. REV.985, 1057 (1998).
71. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231
72. See id.at 231-33 (citing generally S. REP. No. 93-127, at 5 (1973); S.REP. No. 93282, at 17 (1973)).
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patient, while not extending to cases involving an HMO's utilization review
of physician recommended treatment.
The argument that Pegram should be narrowly construed fails for several
reasons. First, a mixed eligibility and treatment decision is a mixed
eligibility and treatment decision regardless of the type of entity making the
coverage decisions. The factors supporting the coverage decision and the
impact of that decision on the patient should be the same, regardless of
whether an HMO through a utilization review or a physician group makes
the coverage decision. In fact, the Court specifically stated that the
"[p]etitioners, Carle Clinic Association, P.C., Health Alliance Medical
Plans, Inc., and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. (collectively
Carle) function as a health maintenance organization (HMO) organized for
profit., 73 Thus, Ms. Herdrich's claim was not merely against the physician
group, but was against a HMO entity.
Second, in any scenario, the physician playing the gatekeeper no longer
acts as a physician in the traditional sense. Rather, the physician acts as a
balancing agent, accepting dual roles when weighing recommended care,
costs of alternative treatments, and the consideration of financial savings.
Accordingly, whether the medical director at an HMO or the treating
physician at a physician group is making the decision, they are doing the
same thing. An expansive reading of Pegram appears to be consistent with
the Supreme Court's recent application of Pegram to a negligence case
from the Pennsylvania state courts, Pappas v. Asbel.
In Pappas v. Asbel (Pappas1), the plaintiff, Basile Pappas, a member of
an HMO operated by U.S. Healthcare, was admitted to Haverford
Community Hospital's emergency room complaining of paralysis and
numbness in his arms, chest, abdomen, and legs.74 Dr. Stephen Dickter, the
emergency room physician, diagnosed an abscess pressing on Pappas'
Dr. Dickter consulted with a neurologist and
spinal column.7 5
neurosurgeon, all of whom agreed that this was a neurological emergency.76
Dr. Dickter arranged for Pappas to be transferred to Jefferson University
Hospital, which had a spinal cord trauma unit. 77 However, when the
ambulance arrived an hour and forty minutes after Pappas' admission, U.S.
Healthcare determined that Mr. Pappas' condition was not emergent and
denied authorization for treatment at Jefferson, a non-approved hospital by
73. Id. at 215.
74. Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711, 713 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), aff'd, Pappas v. Asbel,
724 A.2d 889 (Pa. 1998), vacated & remandedsub nom. U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Pa., Inc. v.
Pa. Hosp. Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 1241 (2000) [hereinafter PappasI].
75. Pappas1,675 A.2d at 713.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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the HMO.7 8 U.S. Healthcare, however, authorized Pappas' transfer to
Hahnemann University Hospital, Temple University Hospital, or the
Medical College of Pennsylvania. 79 Dr. Dickter first contacted Hahnemann
University and more than two hours later Hahnemann responded that it
would not have information on its ability to receive Pappas for at least
another half-hour. The Medical College of Pennsylvania agreed to accept
Pappas, who arrived there four hours after his initial admission to
Haverford.8 °
As a result of the delays, the abscess compressed Pappas' spine causing
quadriplegia.
Pappas sued Dr. Asbel, his primary care physician, and
Haverford Community Hospital, claiming that Dr. Asbel committed
medical malpractice and that Haverford was negligent in causing an
inordinate delay in transferring him to an equipped facility that could
immediately address his injury. 82 Haverford filed a third-party complaint
against U.S. Healthcare for its refusal to authorize the transfer and Dr.
Asbel filed a cross-claim against U.S. Healthcare seeking contribution and
indemnity. 83 The HMO, U.S. Healthcare, moved for summary judgment on
these third party claims alleging that they were preempted by section 514 of
ERISA. 84 The trial court granted U.S. Healthcare's motion.
Haverford Community Hospital, through its insurers, appealed to the
Pennsylvania Superior Court.86 The superior court reversed the trial court's
order granting summary judgment, holding that ERISA did not preempt
Pappas' claims.87 The superior court recognized that Pappas' negligence
claims against U.S. Healthcare did not "relate to" an ERISA plan, as
required by the statute, and therefore were not preempted. 88 U.S.
Healthcare appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which affirmed
the superior court. 89 Relying on the United States Supreme Court's opinion
in Travelers, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized that Congress did
not intend to preempt state negligence laws that had only a "tenuous,
remote or peripheral connection with covered plans," such as the laws at
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.

81.

Pappas1,675 A.2d at 713-14.

82. Id.at 714.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. (noting that Pappas settled his claims against Dr. Asbel and Haverford).
87. Pappas1,675 A.2d at 718.
88. Id. at 717.
89. Pappas 1, 724 A.2d 889, 894 (Pa. 1998) (affirming Pappas 1, 675 A.2d 711 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1996)).
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issue in Travelers that governed the provision of safe medical care.90 Here,
Pappas' negligence claims were intertwined with provisions of safe medical
care when U.S. Healthcare provided "contractually-guaranteed medical
benefits" in such a "dilatory fashion" that Pappas was injured. 91
Accordingly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Pappas's claims
were not preempted by ERISA.
U.S. Healthcare appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 92 The
Court accepted the case and ruled that the judgment of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court be vacated and the case remanded for "further consideration
in light of Pegram v. Herdrich.' '93 Unlike Pegram, there was no issue of a
breach of fiduciary duties in Pappas L It can only be assumed that the
Court wished the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to consider Pappas I in light
of the new "mixed eligibility and treatment decision" language from
94

Pegram.

Seemingly, the only conclusion to draw from the Supreme Court
decision in Pappas I is that the Court expanded Pegram's scope and
application. It is obvious that, if the Court wanted to limit its ruling and
only apply the "mixed eligibility and treatment decision" language to
breaches of fiduciary duties, the Court would not have vacated and
remanded, in light of Pegram, the Pappas case which was based on a
negligence claim. To claim that Pegram only applies to breach of fiduciary
duty claims under ERISA would be to ignore the Supreme Court's decision
in PappasL
Based on the Supreme Court's ruling that Pegram be applied to the
negligence claims in Pappas I and because the Pegram opinion itself
refused to differentiate a physician group from an HMO, it is clear that the
Supreme Court did not intend Pegram to be limited to either the claim of
fiduciary duty or to the types of entities at issue in Pegram. If this is correct
then all utilization review determinations that consider the patient's

90. Id. at 892-93.
91. Id.at 893.
92. U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Penn. v. Penn. Hosp. Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 1241 (2000),
vacating & remanding Pappas v. Asbel, 724 A.2d 899 (Pa. 1999).
93. Id.at 1241.
94. On remand and in light of Pegram, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court adhered to its
opinion and order in Pappas1.The court recognized that, under Travelers, ERISA does not
preempt state laws that regulate the adequacy of medical treatment, and under Pegram an
HMO's mixed eligibility and treatment decisions fall under a state law claim for medical
malpractice and not an ERISA cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. Therefore, if
Haverford's third party claim against U.S. Healthcare "arose out of a mixed decision, it is
according to Pegram, subject to state medical malpractice law, which is what Haverford
asserted. Moreover, under Travelers, it is not preempted by ERISA." Pappas v. Asbel, 768
A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 2001).
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constellation of symptoms or the experimental nature of the requested care
are no longer preempted by ERISA.
III. FEDERAL COURTS HAVE UTILIZED THE PEGRAMJURISPRUDENCE
A number of federal courts have wrestled with the tripartite
jurisprudence from Pegram. With one notable exception, courts have
adopted and applied Pegram in the context of a managed care
organization's determination that recommended care was not medically
necessary, ruling that federal courts lacked jurisdiction pursuant to section
502(a). Only two courts have ruled on the applicability of section 514 and
have reached conflicting results.
A. Cases EliminatingPreemption
1. The Fifth Circuit's Rulings
In Roark v. Humana, Inc., a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled on four district court cases that found preemption. 95 Three of the
cases involved section 502(a) preemption and one case involved section
514. In the section 502(a) cases, the court ruled against preemption.
Among the consolidated cases, the Fifth Circuit identified two
preemption issues. In the cases of Ruby Calad and Juan Davila, the issue
was whether section 502(a) of ERISA preempted claims under a Texas
statute that authorized causes of action against a managed care entity. In
the matter of Gwen Roark, the issue was whether section 514 preempted the
Roarks' claim of wrongful denial of care.97
Ruby Calad filed suit under the Texas Health Care Liability Act
(THCLA), which allowed for suits alleging negligent care against an
HMO.9 8 Ms. Calad alleged that her HMO, CIGNA, negligently caused her
injuries when it failed to approve her for a necessary hospital stay following
surgery. 99 CIGNA removed the case to federal court based on ERISA
preemption. 1°° Ms. Calad unsuccessfully moved the district court to
remand her case, contending that the managed care entity was not acting as
a fiduciary when it denied her medical treatment and therefore section

95. Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298, 302 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. granted sub nom.
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 462 (2003).
96. Id. at 302-03.
97. Id. at311-13.
98. Id. at 302.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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502(a) did not preempt her THCLA claim.' 0 ' Since Ms. Calad's complaint
only raised the THCLA claim and did not raise a claim under ERISA, the
failure to state a cause of
district court dismissed the claim for Ms. 10Calad's
2
granted.
be
could
relief
action upon which
Juan Davila, in a similar claim, sued Aetna, an HMO, under the THCLA,
alleging that the insurer refused to provide him with the medication that his
physician prescribed for arthritis pain.10 3 Instead, Aetna approved a
differing medication for Mr. Davila, which allegedly caused an adverse
10 4
Mr. Davila
reaction and bleeding ulcers that led to a near heart attack.
care in
ordinary
use
to
failed
had
"Aetna
that
claiming
court
sued in state
more
care
substandard
made
making medical decisions, Aetna's systems
necessity
likely, and Aetna acted negligently in making its medical
decisions.' 0 5 Aetna removed the case to the federal district court and, as
with Ms. Calad, the district court concluded that section 502(a) completely
preempted Mr. Davila's state law claims. 0 6 After informing the court that
Mr.
he would not pursue an ERISA claim, the district court dismissed
07
action.
of
cause
a
state
to
failure
for
Davila's claim with prejudice
A panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the
08
The Fifth
district court's decisions in Ms. Calad and Mr. Davila's cases.
as mixed
claims
Circuit relied on Pegram and identified the plaintiffs'
eligibility and treatment decisions subject to state medical malpractice
law.' 0 9 The court ruled that the HMOs were not acting as plan fiduciaries
when denying Ms. Calad and Mr. Davila medical treatment and,
accordingly, section 502(a)(2) could not completely preempt their claims.l"°
Although the Supreme Court in Pilot Life ruled that ERISA provided a
means of collecting benefits as well as an exclusive list of remedies, the
Roark court concluded that its "rule is a narrow one.""' The rule was
simple: a State may not duplicate causes of action provided for in section
502(a) of ERISA. 1 2 Since the THCLA did not provide an action for
collecting benefits, the Roark court held that it was not preempted by

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Roark, 307 F.3d at 306.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Roark, 307 F.3d at 303.
Id. at311.
Id. at 307 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000)).
Id. at306.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 310-11.
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section 502(a)(1)(B) under the Pilot Life jurisprudence." 3 Thus, in the
matters of Ms. Calad and Mr. Davila, the Court did not have to reach the
issue of section 514 conflict preemption, an issue it reached in the claim
alleged by the Roarks.
Gwen and Robert Roark sued a number of Humana HMO entities in
Texas state court, challenging decisions that were made which failed to
provide recommended care for Mrs. Roark, who was bitten by a spider. i1 4
After three skin graft operations and two other surgeries, Ms. Roark's
physician recommended that Ms. Roark use a vacuum-assisted closure
devise to circulate blood around the wound." 5 Several years later, Humana
cancelled Ms. Roark's vacuum and home nursing treatments, even though
Ms. Roark's physician informed them that Roark could lose her leg without
treatment. 116 7 Ms. Roark's leg subsequently became infected and was
amputated."1
The Roarks sued under the THCLA, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practice
Act (DTPA), and the Texas Insurance Code, and alleged common law
claims of breach of good faith and fair dealing and breach of contract. 1 8
Humana alleged ERISA preemption and removed the case to a federal
district court.' 9 The Roarks moved to remand, but the district court denied
the motion, holding that the DTPA and Texas Insurance Code claims were
completely preempted pursuant to section 502(a). 120
Exercising its
supplemental jurisdiction over the Roarks' other claims, the district court
then dismissed the THCLA claims based on section 514 preemption,
utilizing the typical pre-Pegram dichotomy between the administration of
benefits and the quality of the medical care rendered.' 2' A panel of the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reluctantly affirmed. 122
The Fifth Circuit first determined that the district court properly
exercised jurisdiction over the claim because the Roarks, unlike Ms. Calad
and Mr. Davila, amended their complaint to allege a breach of contract
claim, which was preempted by ERISA. 123 Contract claims, such as the one
the Roarks asserted, were "precisely the type of contract claim we recognize
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Roark, 307 F.3d at 311.
Id. at 304.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 303-04.
Id.at 311-12.
Roark, 307 F.3d at 312.
Id.
Id.at313.
Id. at315.
Id.at312.
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under [section] 502(a)(1)(B).' ' 124 The Fifth Circuit therefore concluded that
the district court had jurisdiction over at least one1 25of the claims and could
others.
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
Next, addressing the substantive matter, the Roark court recognized that
a decision of another panel of the Fifth Circuit, in Corcoran v. United
Healthcare, was on point. 26 In Corcoran, the HMO determined that the
hospitalization of Ms. Corcoran was not necessary, but instead authorized
home nursing.127 When a nurse was not on duty, Ms. Corcoran miscarried
and her baby died. 128 The Corcoran panel stated that the HMO made
medical decisions "in the context of' determining the availability of
benefits under the plan. 129 Since the Corcorans were "attempting to recover
for a tort allegedly committed in the course of handling a benefit
ERISA section 514.130
determination" the cause of action was preempted by
The Roark panel of the Fifth Circuit expressed concerns over the holding
of Corcoran, in light of Pegram, where the Supreme Court stated that
ERISA could not preempt causes of action that arose out of a mixed
After Corcoran, if the physician
eligibility and treatment decision.'
coverage, the patient has no
denies
HMO
the
recommends treatment and
recovery. Therefore, the Corcoran decision allows the HMO to escape
liability if the HMO tells the physicians to recommend every32 possible
administrator.
treatment, but leaves the real decision to the HMO
Moreover, the Roark court recognized that Corcoran had been decided
before the Supreme Court's "trilogy" of Travelers, Dillingham, and
DeBuono, which significantly narrowed the scope of section 514
preemption and undermined Corcoran in two important ways. First, the
Court established that traditional preemption rules apply under ERISA.
Thus, courts should presume ERISA does not preempt areas such as general
health care regulation, which historically has been a matter of local concern.
Second, the Court held that a state's economic impact (direct or33indirect) on
preemption.
plan structures is not enough to trigger section 514
Nevertheless, the Roark panel concluded, "[i]f we were writing on a
clean slate, or deciding this en banc, the Roarks would have a strong case
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Roark, 307 F.3d at 313.
Id. (relying on Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992)).
Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1324.
Id.
Id. at 1331.
Id. at 1332.
Roark, 307 F.3d at 315 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211,236-37 (2000)).
Id. at 315 (citing Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338).
Roark, 307 F.3d at 315 (internal citations omitted).
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against ERISA preemption. But, as a panel we are bound by Corcoran.'' 34
Pursuant to Corcoran, the Roark panel of the Fifth Circuit reluctantly
agreed with the district court and held that section 514 of ERISA preempted
135
the Roarks' THCLA claim against Humana.
The Roarks filed a request for a rehearing en banc, but the Fifth Circuit
denied that request. 136 The Roarks then petitioned the Supreme Court for
certioraribut the matter was settled before a decision was made regarding
review. 37 However, the Supreme Court did grant Ms. Calad and Mr.
Davila's petitions for certiorariand the Supreme Court heard arguments on
both cases in March of 2004.131 It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court
accepted two cases that only address ERISA section 502(a) preemption and
not the section 514 defense.
2. The Second Circuit's Ruling in Cicio
In the first case determined by a circuit court of appeals eliminating both
section 502(a) and section 514 preemption, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that claims against an HMO and its medical directors for
alleged wrongful denials of treatment did not provide federal jurisdiction,
were not dismissible pursuant to section 514, and could proceed under state
medical malpractice law.
In Cicio v. Does, a case which this author argued at the district court and
before the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the decedent's physician had
recommended a double stem cell transplant which the defendant, Vytra, had
denied on two separate occasions. 39 Initially, the company refused the
request based on the determination that it was experimental and
investigational. 40 When the physician appealed, Vytra still denied the
double stem cell transplant but approved a single one instead. 14 1 However,
by the time approval for the single stem cell transplant was received, nearly
two months later, the window of opportunity for a successful transplant had
42
passed and Mr. Cicio subsequently died.'
134. Id.
135. Id. at315.
136. See Roark v. Humana Inc., No. 01-10831, 01-10891, 01-10905, 66 Fed. Appx. 527,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 8603 (5th Cir. Apr. 15, 2003)
137. See Roark v. Humana, Inc., 124 S. Ct. 44 (2003).
138. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 462 (2003); CIGNA Healthcare of Tex.,
Inc. v. Calad, 124 S. Ct. 463 (2003).
See also http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral arguments/argument transcripts/02-1 845.pdf (transcript of oral argument).
139. Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2003) affg in part, vacating and
remanding in part Cicio v. Vytra Healthcare, 208 F. Supp. 2d 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2001).
140. Id. at 88.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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The decedent's wife filed suit against both Vytra and its medical director
alleging negligence, gross negligence, medical malpractice, breach of
fiduciary duty, misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, tortious interference with the patient-physician relationship, and
143
The district
violation of New York's Deceptive Business Practices Act.
at least
over
jurisdiction
had
it
court ruled that, pursuant to section 502(a),
section
on
based
some of the claims and dismissed the case in its entirety
514 and the144 court's application of a pre-Pegram dichotomous
jurisprudence.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed the preemptive scope of
ERISA regarding Ms. Cicio's medical malpractice claim, which challenged
the utilization review determinations recommended for the treatment of Mr.
Cicio. 145 The court stated that the:
[Q]uestion [of] whether a state law medical malpractice claim brought
with respect to a medical decision made in the course of prospective
utilization review by a managed care organization or health insurer is
the reach of
preempted under ERISA [section] 514, and therefore beyond
46
Circuit.
this
in
impression
first
of
one
is
state tort law,
The court first addressed the nature of utilization review, recognizing
that it usually involves "prospective review by a third party of the necessity
147
Prospective
of medical care," which is "quasi-medical" in nature.
between48
boundaries"
"blurs
utilization review, as noted by the court,
domain.1
managerial
the
and
profession
traditional aspects of the medical
The court further recognized that utilization reviews often involve the
exercise of medical judgment related to a particular patient's symptoms,
that these decisions are made independent of the treating physician, and that
have dispositive
these decisions, because of their prospective nature,
149
receives.
patient
the
that
consequences for the treatment
Relating utilization review to ERISA preemption and considering the
preemptive scope of ERISA, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals observed
that, over the years, the scope of ERISA preemption had narrowed. The
court noted that initially the U.S. Supreme Court afforded ERISA an
"expansive preemptive effect that corresponded to the provision's broad
143. Id. at 88-89.
144. Id.at 89.
145. Cicio, 321 F.3d at 90-91.
146. Id. at 97-98.
147. Id. at 98 (quoting Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1326 (5th
Cir. 1992)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 98-99.
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wording.' ' 5° More recently, however, the Supreme Court has "tempered the
assumption that the ordinary meaning [of section 514 of ERISA] accurately
express[ed] the legislative purpose.' 15' The Second Circuit followed the
guidance of the Supreme Court, which held that a court must begin with the
presumption "that in the field of health care, a subject of traditional state
regulation, there is no ERISA preemption without clear manifestations of
' 52
congressional purpose.'
Importantly, the Second Circuit stated that, "[m]oving beyond
presumptions, the Supreme Court has also, in its own words, thrown 'cold
water' on the idea that state regulation of health and safety is necessarily
preempted even when it overlaps with rights protected by ERISA."' 53 In
light of the Supreme Court's warning that the state law regulation of
medical practice should not be lightly disturbed, the Cicio court considered
the question of whether Ms. Cicio's medical malpractice claims "related
to" the benefits plan administered by Vytra so as to be preempted by
54
ERISA. 1
Upon identifying the issue, the Cicio court addressed the purpose of
ERISA, which is to protect contractually defined benefits and to ensure that
benefits will be paid to plan participants. 55 The court distinguished this
from state medical malpractice laws which involve duties of conduct that
are independent of ERISA plans.' 56 As such, malpractice claims are not
among the "'rights and expectations brought into being by [ERISA],' that
157
[section] 502(a) is designed to protect."'
In determining whether the medical malpractice claims in the case were
preempted by ERISA, the court analyzed the following: (1) the ruling in
Pegram and its implications; 158 (2) the application of Pegram's tripartite
analysis to ERISA preemption; 159 and (3) the distinction between treating
60
physicians and utilization review agents.
In assessing the decision in Pegram, the Cicio court initially considered
prior cases related to utilization review. In particular, the court cited the
150. Id. at 99.
151. Cicio, 321 F.3d at 99 (quoting Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355,
359 (2002)).
152. Id. (quoting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000)).
153. Id. at 99.
154. Id. at 100.
155. Id.at 99.
156. Id. at 99-100.
157. Cicio, 321 F.3d at 100 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990)).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 102.
160. Id. at 104.
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earlier cases of Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Jass v. Prudential, and
Tolton v. American Biodyne, which stood for the principle that preemption
was triggered without regard to the medical content of the decision as long
6
review decision.' 1
as there was a benefits component to a utilization
However, these cases were decided before the Supreme Court's Pegram
cases' dichotomy of "benefits
decision, which abolished the prior
162
decisions" and "medical decisions.,
The Cicio court recognized that a physician does not have to control or
influence the patient's treatment, but can simply make a decision to
authorize or deny reimbursement, in order for that decision to be a mixed
163 In
eligibility and treatment decision under the Pegram jurisprudence.
essence, the decision of who will "pay for" a procedure is a mixed
eligibility and treatment decision if the decision involves figuring out the
64 The court inferred that
appropriate medical response to care for a patient.
"the continued availability of some state law malpractice actions based on
of utilization review decisions was a predicate of the
at least some varieties
165
holding."'
[Pegram]
The Second Circuit noted that the Pegram holding had ramifications for
its decision in Cicio because of the Supreme Court's description and
66
The court duly
analysis of decision-making in modem healthcare.1
that mixed
determined
and
referenced the tripartite structure from Pegram
by HMOs, not merely
eligibility and treatment decisions can be made
67
Pegram.1
in
as
entities
physicians or physician
Reiterating that Pegram altered the framework used in prior cases, such
as Corcoran, the Second Circuit plainly stated that managed care entities
have intruded into the sphere of medical autonomy, thus necessitating
68
In today's healthcare
responsibility by managed care agents.'
to that of the
analogous
decisions
make
payers
third-party
environment,
professional
between
"separation
perceived
treating physician and the
preemption
ERISA
providers and lay financiers" upon which the previous
69 Thus, with the rule of Pegram, the
cases were premised, no longer exists.
Cicio court effectively overturned all prior Second Circuit law, specifically

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 100.
Id. at 102.
Cicio, 321 F.3d at 102.
Id.
Id. at 101.
Id.
Id. at 102.
See id.
Cicio, 321 F.3d at 102 (additional citation omitted).
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calling the Corcoran analysis into doubt. 170
The court next applied Pegram's tripartite analysis to ERISA
preemption. 17 1 Based on the analytic framework of Pegram and Congress'
intent in enacting ERISA, the Second Circuit concluded that a state law
malpractice action based on a "mixed eligibility and treatment decision" is
not subject to ERISA preemption when the cause of action challenges a
flawed medical judgment. 172 In accepting Pegram'stripartite structure, the
Cicio court
effectively
renounced
the
"quality/quantity"
or
"administration/treatment" dichotomy previously used. 173 The dichotomy
lineage ignored the nature of "countless medical administrative decisions"
made every day in which "the eligibility decision and the treatment decision
1 74
are inextricably mixed.'
In contrast with all previous case law, particularly the oft-cited ruling in
Corcoran, the Cicio court determined that the presence of an administrative
component is not dispositive of ERISA preemption when the benefits
decision also has a medical component. 175 Consequentially, defendants
should no longer be able to argue ERISA preemption in any state-based tort
claim or in cases where medical decision-making overlays contractual
claims, which would ordinarily be preempted by ERISA. 176
Finally, the court reinforced the medical nature of utilization review
decisions and the nature of ERISA as a statute designed to protect
consumers and not one intended to deprive them of their rights. 7 7 The
court renewed its earlier proclamation that "nothing in ERISA suggests that
Congress intended any displacement of 'the quintessentially state-law
standards of reasonable medical care' as applied to the medical component
of a mixed decision."'
As such, the court saw no reason to preempt state
law medical malpractice actions that rested on the application of standards
79
for medical decision-making. 1
In the last section of the opinion, the Cicio court addressed the
distinction between treating physicians and utilization review agents,
finding that there was no credible means of distinguishing the two. 80 The
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
(2002)).
179.
180.

Id. at 100-02.
Id. at 102.
Id.
Id. at 103.
Id. (quoting Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229).
Cicio, 321 F.3d at 103.
Id.
Id. at 103-04.
Id. at 103 (quoting Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 365
Id. at 104.
Id.
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court stated that "[e]ven when making decisions about whether to pay for
decide what to do in particular
particular procedures, 'physicians still must'' 81
cases' on the basis of medical assessments."
In addition to finding that there was no meaningful distinction between
physicians and utilization review agents, the court also stated that it was not
possible to separate the benefit determinations from the medical decisions
made by doctors in managed care entities. 182 Even if it could, such a
distinction would not vitiate the ability to pursue a state medical
malpractice claim. 183 If Ms. Cicio could establish that the HMO medical
director's decision to refuse a double stem cell transplant violated a state
law duty of professional care, "they [were] hard pressed to see how the
defendants could successfully contend-as a defense to the tort action-that
the contract permitted them to violate a state law duty standard of care. 184
Although the Cicio decision was handed down recently, it has already
been influential in other circuits. In Land v. CIGNA Healthcareof Florida,
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled consistently with Pegram and
85
approvingly cited the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in Cicio.1
In Land, the plaintiff had developed an infection in his hand which his
physicians determined required in-hospital treatment. 18 6 The CIGNA
approval nurse, upon review of the admission, determined that the infection
was not sufficiently severe to warrant hospitalization and decided that the
intravenous antibiotic treatment should be provided on an outpatient
basis. 187 By the following week the plaintiffs condition had88worsened
1
considerably and ultimately resulted in amputation of his finger.
The plaintiff filed suit in state court and alleged that CIGNA was
negligent in the care and treatment of his infection.189 CIGNA removed the
case to a federal district court, which dismissed the plaintiffs case ruling
that ERISA completely preempted the plaintiffs claims. 190 The plaintiff
appealed and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district
court in light of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in Pegram.191 The
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the nurse's decision was not a "simple yes-

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Cicio, 321 F.3d at 104 (citing Pegram,530 U.S. at 229).
Id.
Id. at 105.
Id.
Land v. CIGNA Healthcare of Fla., 339 F.3d 1286 (11th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 1288.
Id.
Id. at 1289.
Id.
Id.
Land, 339 F.3d at 1290-94.
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or-no eligibility determination" but was an eligibility decision that was
intertwined with the medical decision that inpatient treatment was
unnecessary to treat the plaintiffs infection.' 92 The nurse "made a patientspecific prescription of appropriate treatment by denying one treatment and
authorizing another."'' 93 As a "mixed eligibility and treatment decision,"
the issue was whether the plaintiffs claim was completely preempted
pursuant to section 502(a)(1)(B) as an attempt to recover benefits. 194 Just as
the Second Circuit did in Cicio, the Eleventh Circuit looked at the recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the role of the states in regulating health care,
and Congressional intent in enacting ERISA. 195 Accordingly, the Land
court determined that Congress did not intend to federalize medical
malpractice claims and therefore the plaintiffs claims were not preempted
by ERISA section 502(a). 196 Since the plaintiffs complaint did not present
97
a federal question, removal to the federal district court was inappropriate.1
In addition to the Second and Eleventh circuit courts, two other courts
have similarly found against preemption. In Isaac v. Seabury & Smith, the
District Court for the Southern District of Indiana held that claims related to
mixed eligibility and treatment decisions were not preempted by ERISA
and as such the federal district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the
claim. 198 In Isaac,Judy Ambrugey did not participate in an HMO but rather
participated in a health benefit "fee-for-service" plan through her employer,
to which the defendant served as an administrator. 99 After contracting
leukemia, Ms. Ambrugey's oncologist requested that the plan administrator
authorize insurance coverage for a bone marrow transplant. 200 Initially, the
administrator denied coverage because the procedure was not "medically
necessary.",20 ' One month later, the administrator gave "conditional
approval" for the transplant, but tragically, Ms. Ambrugey died before any
transplant could occur.20 2
A representative of Ms. Ambrugey filed suit in an Indiana state court and
the defendants removed the case to federal district court, arguing that the

192.
193.
194.

Id.at 1292.
Id.(quoting Cicio, 321 F.3d at 104).
Id.at 1293.

195.

Id.

196. Id.
197. Land, 339 F.3d at 1294.
198. Isaac v. Seabury & Smith, Inc., No. IPO1-1437 B/S, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12413,
at *27 (S.D. Ind. July 5, 2002).
199. Id. at *3.
200. Id.
201. Id.at *4.
202. Id.
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claims were completely preempted by ERISA. 20 3 The district court
analyzed the claim based on the tripartite distinction utilized in Pegram and
ruled that it was a "mixed eligibility and treatment decision" and therefore
not preempted by ERISA section 502(a). 204 According to the court, the
defendant made two decisions. One decision denied Ms. Ambrugey
coverage because the procedure was not "medically necessary" and the
other granted "conditional approval" for the operation .205 Both involved a
coverage decision, whether Ms. Ambrugey was eligible under the plan for
the transplant, and a treatment decision, whether the transplant was
medically necessary. 206
More importantly, the district court also clearly announced that the
Pegramjurisprudence applied to all decision-makers, whether an HMO, a
physician employed by an HMO, or a physician engaged by a third-party
administrator. °7 The Pegram decision "focused on decisions: eligibility
decisions, treatment decisions, and mixed decisions of treatment and
eligibility., 20 8 It did not focus on who provided the treatment. 20 9 Therefore,
the third-party administrator that made the decision to deny Ms. Ambrugey
coverage fell within the "Pegram regime.' 210
A similar result was attained in Pappas v. Asbel, infra, after the United
States Supreme Court remanded the case for "further consideration in light
of Pegram v. Herdrich.,,211 For the second time, Pappasv. Asbel (Pappas
fl) came to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. However, unlike Isaac where
the district court considered section 502(a) preemption, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in reviewing Pappas addressed section 514 claims.
In the remanded Pappas H case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
affirmed its prior decision. 21 2 The Pappas II court noted that it was
irrelevant who made the mixed eligibility and treatment decision,
comparing the physician-owned HMO in Pegramto U.S. Healthcare, which
contracted independent physicians for services. 2 3 The HMO's
decision
214
was the seminal factor, not the structure of the HMO making it.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id.
Isaac,2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12413, at *18.
Id.at*18.
Id.
Id. at *25.
Id. at *26.
Id.
Isaac, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12413, at *27.
U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Penn. v. Penn. Hosp. Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 1241, 1241 (2000).
Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089, 1096-97 (Pa. 2001) [hcrcinafter PappasII].
Id.at 1094 & n.4.
Id.
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After reviewing the ERISA preemption jurisprudence, the Pappas II
court held that the defendant made a mixed eligibility and treatment
decision, which was not preempted by ERISA.215 The HMO physician
reviewed Pappas' case, rejected another physician's opinion, and referred
Pappas according to his personal medical opinion.2 16 In doing so, the
physician did not make a "simple yes or no decision" as to whether Pappas'
condition was covered; he decided whether it was covered and how it
should be treated.217 Because the case involved a mixed eligibility and
treatment decision, the adverse consequences should have been redressed
through the state medical malpractice law and not disposed of via
ERISA.218
3. Even Courts Which Have Found Preemption Have
Made Determinations Consistent with Pegram
Even courts which have held in favor of the managed care entity on
ERISA preemption issues have been consistent with Pegram. For example,
in Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, the Third Circuit considered whether an
HMO's delay in approving benefits to a plan participant, when the
participant sought "out of network" care, constituted an administrative
decision by the HMO. 21 9 The court determined that the consideration of innetwork versus out-of-network providers was a purely administrative
function not preempted by ERISA. EE°
The Pryzbowski court approvingly cited Pegram and recognized that
Pegram's distinction between "eligibility decisions" and "treatment
decisions" was applicable to complete preemption analyses, and not just
fiduciary duty causes of action. 2 l Per Pegram, the ultimate issue for
complete preemption cases rests on whether the claim "challenges the
administration of or eligibility for benefits, which falls within the scope of
section 502(a) and is completely preempted, or the quality of the medical
22
treatment performed, which may be the subject of a state action. 2
Ultimately, the Pryzbowski court held that the claims against U.S.
Healthcare were limited to the HMO's delay in approving benefits, which
fell squarely within the administrative function of managed care practice

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.at 1096.
Id.
Id.
Pappasl, 768 A.2d at 1096-97.
Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 274-75 (3d Cir. 2001).
Id.at 276.
Id.at 273.
Id.
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and were completely preempted by ERISA.223
Likewise, in Marks v. Watters, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
correctly applied the principles of Pegram and found the claims
preempted.224 In Marks, Robert Cleavenger was hospitalized after he
attempted suicide.225 Health Assurance, a preferred provider organization
(PPO), provided Cleavenger's healthcare benefits.226 Under this system,
Cleavenger could choose his own healthcare provider; if he chose a
"participating provider," Health Assurance would cover 100% of his costs
and if Cleavenger chose to go outside the network, Health Assurance would
cover 80% of his costs. 227 Four days after being hospitalized, a physician
discharged Cleavenger, who expressed concerns that he would lose his job
if he stayed.228 Once released, Shelley Watters, a case manager from
Mainstay, a behavioral healthcare component of Health Assurance,
contacted Cleavenger to arrange for outpatient services.22 9 Cleavenger
attended one outpatient appointment but no others. Eight days after being
released from the hospital, Cleavenger killed his wife and daughter and then
committed suicide.23 °
The representatives of the decedents sought damages alleging that
Cleavenger had not been properly treated or monitored during his outpatient
treatment.231 In addition to suing the physicians and the hospital, the
232
plaintiffs brought an action against Mainstay, the managed care entity.
Health Assurance and Mainstay removed the case to federal court claiming
complete preemption under ERISA; thereafter, the district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment.2 33 The Fourth Circuit affirmed,
stating that Mainstay's case managers had no authority to decline approval
for treatment, but merely managed Cleavenger's utilization of his healthcare
benefits.234 Accordingly, Mainstay and Health Assurance's decisions were
purely administrative and therefore were within the scope of section 502(a)
223. Id. at 274-75. The court went on to say that to allow Pryzbowski's claim to go
forward would be to open the door for legal challenges to core managed care practices such
as, for example, the policy of favoring in-network specialists over out-of-network specialists.
Id.
224. Marks v. Watters, 322 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2003).
225. Id. at 319.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 320.
229. Id. at319-20.
230. Marks, 322 F.3d at 320-21.
231. Id. at321.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 325.
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and completely preempted.2 35
Notably, the Eleventh Circuit in Land used Pryzbowski and Marks to
support its holding, even though these cases had contrary results.236
B. Courts Finding Preemption
In DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare,the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to apply the Pegram tripartite structure, and determined that section
502(a) provided complete preemption for all but one claim. 237 The court
avoided ruling on section 514 preemption and remanded the remaining
238
"hospital discharge" claim to the district court for further consideration.
In that case, Joseph DiFelice received a tracheostomy tube for his sleep
apnea and an upper airway obstruction. 239 Since the tube repeatedly came
out, his physician requested a special tube. 240 However, DiFelice's HMO,
Aetna U.S. Healthcare, functioning as the administrator of his employer's
welfare benefit plan, determined that the requested tube was "medically
unnecessary. '' 24 As a result, DiFelice's physician inserted a different tube,
which caused DiFelice severe pain and resulted in an infection.24 2 DiFelice
was subsequently admitted to another hospital for treatment but was
allegedly discharged at Aetna's insistence.243
DiFelice filed suit in state court alleging that Aetna's decisions were
negligent under state law.244 Aetna removed the case to federal court on the
basis of ERISA preemption.245 The district court, agreeing with Aetna, held
that the case was completely preempted and dismissed it in its entirety. 246
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part, and reversed and
remanded in part.247
The Third Circuit considered the allegations separately and held that
DiFelice's claim that he was forced to leave the hospital was not
preempted,24 8 while the claim that Aetna refused to authorize the special

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

Id. at 327.
Land v. CIGNA Healthcare of Fla., 339 F.3d 1286, 1294 (11th Cir. 2003).
DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 449-50 (3d Cir. 2003).
Id. at 453.
Id. at 444.
Id.
Id.
Id.
DiFelice,346 F.3d at 444.
Id.at 445.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 444.
Id. at 453.
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tube was preempted. 249 The court found that Aetna's determination fell
between the eligibility-treatment dichotomy established in Pryzbowski, and
further scrutinized the claim to determine whether it could arise under
section 502(a). 250 The Third Circuit in Pryzbowski found that the "qualityquantity" distinction set forth in prior decisions was unclear and suggested
which
that the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Pegram,2 51
helpful.
more
was
decisions,
treatment
from
distinguished eligibility
Despite the fact that the court made special note of the Pegram
distinction, in actuality, the court distinguished the Pegram tripartite
analysis as only applying to claims of breaches of fiduciary duties.252
Instead, the court favored the Pryzbowski eligibility-treatment dichotomy,
which ultimately led the DiFelice court to the question of whether the claim
could have been the subject of a civil enforcement action under section
502(a).253 In quoting Pryzbowski, the DiFelice court stated:
Regardless of the language used, the ultimate distinction to make for
purposes of complete preemption is whether the claim challenges the
administration of or eligibility for benefits, which falls within the scope
of [section] 502(a) and is completely preempted, or the quality of the
medical254treatment performed, which may be the subject of a state
action.
Similar to the jurisprudence set forth in pre-Pegram cases, the court
observed that if the claim could have been brought under section 502(a), it
would be preempted.255 In setting forth its process of determining
preemption, the Third Circuit stated that under Pryzbowski, the first
question is whether the claim is preempted by section 502(a) and this
determination is based on whether a claim is entirely administrative, in
which case the claim would be preempted, or entirely treatment, in which
case the claim would not be preempted.2 56 If the claim falls in between,
then the complaint must be analyzed to determine if any of the alleged
wrongdoing could have been the basis for a suit under section 502(a).2 57
The court applied this analysis to DiFelice's claim regarding Aetna's

249. DiFelice,346 F.3d at 449.
250. Id. at 448-49.
251. Id. at 446-47 (citing Pryzbowski v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 245 F.3d 266, 273 (3d
Cir. 2001)).
252. Id. at 450.
253. Id. at 447.
254. Id. (quoting Pryzbowski, 245 F.3d at 273).
255. DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 447.
256. Id at 448.
257. Id. at 447.
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failure to authorize the requested tracheostomy tube. In addressing whether
Aetna's "medical necessity" determination was a treatment decision or an
eligibility decision, the court noted that Aetna's actions in denying approval
for the tube had "aspects of treatment and coverage., 258 However, there
was "no allegation that Aetna actually provided the medical care, and
Aetna's use of medical judgment could only have led to an eligibility, not a
treatment, decision. 259
This statement appears to indicate that the DiFelice court intentionally
avoided the literal tripartite jurisprudence expressed in Pegram and utilized
by the Second Circuit in Cicio. As a result, the Third Circuit appears to
have resorted to a pre-Pegram analysis similar to the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Corcoran where the court ruled that although Aetna made a
medical decision, the medical decision was made in the context of an
insurance determination and, therefore, was only an eligibility decision.26 °
The DiFelice court engaged in a similar analysis and collapsed the "pure
eligibility" and "mixed eligibility and treatment" decision categories, noting
that Aetna's use of medical judgment could only lead to an eligibility
decision.2 6 1
However, the court's analysis did not end there. Because the court felt
that DiFelice's claim was both a medical treatment and an eligibility
decision and fell between the two poles discussed in Pryzbowski, the court
determined whether the claim could be brought under a section 502(a) civil
enforcement action.2 62 In reviewing the claim, the court found that DiFelice
could have challenged Aetna's determination not to provide him with the
tube by "filing a claim under 502(a)(1)(B) 'to recover benefits due to him
under the term of his plan.' ' 263 Because DiFelice could have brought the
claim under section 502(a), his claim was held to be completely preempted
by ERISA.264
Determining that the claim was mixed and preempted because it could
have been brought as a request for intervention pursuant to section 502(a)
resembles the traditional approach to preemption and is inconsistent with
the tripartite jurisprudence. If the determination at issue was held to be a
mixed decision and the Third Circuit followed the Supreme Court reasoning
in Pegram, this would necessitate a ruling that preemption did not apply.
Since the DiFelice court determined that the claim involved a mixed
258.
259.

Id. at 449.
Id. at 449 (emphasis

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1331 (5th Cir. 1992)
DiFelice, 346 F.3d at 449.
Id.
Id.
Id.

added).
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decision, rather than an eligibility decision, the court implicated a
trichotomous classification, as in Pegram. However, the Third Circuit
determined that DiFelice's claim was mixed and still preempted because it
could have been brought as a request for intervention pursuant to section
502(a), an approach based on the old "quality/quantity" distinction. It is
important to note that if the DiFelice court had determined that this was
merely an eligibility decision, consistent with the reasoning in Corcoran,
the court could have dismissed the claim. Instead, the court determined that
the claim was a new type of claim, a mixed eligibility and treatment
decision, and the court fashioned a new rule regarding these types of
determinations, rather than applying the Supreme Court's rule from
Pegram.
If DiFelice's claim truly involved a mixed decision and the Third Circuit
followed the Supreme Court's ruling in Pegram, it would have necessitated
a ruling that preemption did not apply. However, the DiFelice court
considered Pegram to be limited to situations in which the specific entities
at issue were physician-owners, and the individuals were acting as
fiduciaries.26 5
The DiFelice court did not address the Supreme Court's ruling in U.S.
Healthcare, which vacated and remanded Pappas v. Asbel and appeared to
mandate an expansion of the applicability of the tripartite jurisprudence
266 By
from Pegram to HMO's and other non-physician-owned entities.
failing to utilize Pegram and apply the new classification, the DiFelice
court allowed itself to engage in reasoning typical of pre-Pegram claims,
resorting to an analysis of whether DiFelice's claim could have been
brought pursuant to section 502(a) and finding the claim completely
preempted.
It is critical to note the consequences of limiting Pegram, and this is
easily seen when comparing Cicio and DiFelice. A just consideration of
Pegram, as in Cicio and Land, leads to only one question: whether the
determination is a mixed eligibility and treatment decision. If it is, then the
mere classification of a decision into the "mixed eligibility and treatment"
category would necessitate the denial of ERISA preemption in a federal
court with an order vacating and remanding the case for further proceedings
under state medical malpractice law. However, if Pegram is limited, as in
DiFelice,then a court may view the determination as a mixed eligibility and
treatment decision, but limit its application, in some sense almost
eliminating the category of mixed decisions except with entities similar to
265. Id.
266. See U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Penn. v. Penn. Hosp. Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 1241 (2000);
Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 2001).
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those in Pegram. Such a split interpretation certainly cannot be permitted
and would seem to be a motivating force behind the reason why the
Supreme Court accepted review of Caladand Davila.267
After considering DiFelice's claim regarding Aetna's failure to authorize
the nasal tube, the DiFelice court considered DiFelice's claim that he was
improperly discharged from the hospital.268 Unlike his first claim, DiFelice
did not claim that the discharge was pursuant to a medical necessity
decision; indeed, the court stated that it was difficult to tell from DiFelice's
"vague" pleadings what he was actually alleging. 269 The court
stated that
"the claim on its face [was] not plan-related," but the pleadings did not
suggest that it could not be.27 ° Since the court could not rule on whether the
hospital discharge claim would be preempted, the court remanded it for
further determinations. 271 Courts have repeatedly read behind the face of
complaints alleging wrongful denial of care, so it is unusual that this court
failed to do So.272 Yet the court ruled that "[a]t the dismissal stage, it was
Aetna's burden to prove federal jurisdiction by proving that this is an
ERISA claim. '' 173 Does this mean that the court is expecting the pleadings
to be amplified at the district court level? Or is the Third Circuit implying
that plaintiffs in these actions word their complaints as vaguely as possible
so as to avoid federal preemption?
IV. How

WILL THE SUPREME COURT RULE?

The Supreme Court has finally accepted two cases that will determine
the applicability of ERISA preemption in the context of utilization review
determinations. However, it is noteworthy that the cases the Court has
accepted, Calad and Davila, are limited in scope and only require rulings
on section 502(a) preemption. Because Cicio addressed both section 502(a)
and section 514 preemption, it would have been the better vehicle to
determine the full range of ERISA preemption issues. It is somewhat
267. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 462 (2003); CIGNA Healthcare of
Tex., Inc. v. Calad, 124 S. Ct. 463 (2003). See also http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
oral arguments/argument transcripts/02-1845.pdf (transcript of oral argument).
268. DiFelice,346 F.3d at 452.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 452-53.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 452-53. Notably, earlier in its opinion, the court stated:
In the more difficult situation in which the claim falls somewhere in between, we
must scrutinize the complaint for "artful pleading," and then refer to section
502(a) itself and determine whether the actual alleged wrongdoing underlying the
causes of action could have formed the basis of a suit under that section.
Id. at 448.
273. DiFelice,346 F.3d at 452.
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perplexing why the Court failed to accept Cicio, a case which addressed
both section 502(a) and section 514 preemption, explicated the Supreme
Court's mixed eligibility and treatment decision language, and is not
intertwined with any state law pertaining to suits against managed care
entities.
It is possible that the Court will rule on both types of preemption. It
may, through dicta, rule on section 514 preemption within the context of the
cases involving section 502(a). And it is not inconceivable that the Court
will decide the section 502(a) issue against preemption and then observe
what lower courts do with the questions of the section 514 defense. This is
consistent with the Court's refusal to review Pappas II, which only
considered section 514, after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court utilized the
Pegramjurisprudence.
In relation to the Court's consideration of section 502(a) preemption,
prior rulings by the Court may indicate how it will decide Calad and
Davila. Two considerations seem to suggest that the Court will eliminate
ERISA's complete preemption of utilization review claims. First, the
2 74 Furthermore,
language of Pegramclearly identifies a new jurisprudence.
the vacatur and remand in U.S. Healthcare, which vacated and remanded
Pappas v. Asbel, would seem to indicate that the Supreme Court believes
that this ruling and its tripartite jurisprudence should not be limited to the
5
physician-owned entity at issue in Pegram.27
Second, the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that matters of health
and safety are traditionally relegated to the states and that "the historic
police powers of the states [are] not to be superceded by the federal act
of Congress. 276
[ERISA] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose
Indeed, both of the recent Supreme Court rulings in Pegram and Rush
that health care
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran support the contention
277
interest.
state
traditional
of
matter
a
regulation is
In Rush Prudential, the plaintiff requested treatment from an out-ofnetwork provider because no in-network physician could perform the

274. See generally Pegran v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
275. See generally U.S. Healthcare Sys. of Penn. v. Penn. Hosp. Ins. Co., 530 U.S. 1241
(2000); Pappas v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 2001).
276. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
514 U.S. 645, 665 (1995), quoted in Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355,
365 (2002).
277. See David L. Trueman, The Impact of the Recent Supreme CourtRulings in Pegram
and Rush Prudential on State Regulation of Managed Care Organizations,J. HEALTH L.,
Winter 2003 (providing an analysis of Pegram and Rush Prudential and the Supreme
Court's affirmation that the regulation of health care is within the province of the state and
the impact of that position on managed care).
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surgery that was recommended by the physicians.278 Illinois's HMO Act
mandated that, in cases of dispute between the recommendations of the
patient's primary care physician and the managed care entity, the patient
could request a binding independent review. 279 Although the independent
reviewers sided with the plaintiff, the company refused to comply and
sought to invalidate the state statute as conflicting with ERISA section
514.280 In ruling that the Illinois law was saved by the saving clause of
section 514 and was not subject to preemption, the Court iterated that the
regulation of health care was a state matter, a position it had previously
espoused in Pegram.28'
The Court's position that health care regulation is a matter of state
control along with its decisions in Pegram and U.S. Healthcarewould lead
to a prediction that the Court will, at a minimum, end section 502(a)
preemption. But, what other steps may occur? If the Court chooses not to
rule on section 514 preemption, this section would surely be at the heart of
the next battle. Presumably, the Court would wait until there is a conflict
between the Circuits before accepting a case to decide the section 514
preemption issue.
If the Court decides to end section 514 preemption, then the struggle
between HMOs and patients would occur in state court. And since medical
malpractice claims seem to be the only actions that would be allowed to
proceed in a state court, questions would arise regarding the viability of
such actions. Issues regarding duties and relationships between healthcare
organizations, its medical personnel, and the insured plan participants
would be addressed in the state court forum. Should the Supreme Court
end ERISA preemption, it is entirely possible that plaintiffs might be unable
to prevail in state court because of barriers to demonstrating elements of
medical malpractice claims. Thus, even if the Court takes the most
expansive view of Pegramand rules against both types of preemption, there
will not be clarity regarding claims against managed care entities for
medical decision-making within the context of utilization review.
Oddly, there was no mention of the term "mixed eligibility and
treatment" in the oral arguments of Calad and Davila before the Supreme
Court on March 23, 2004.282 Arguing before the court were the attorneys
for the health plan, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Solicitor General's
Office (arguing on behalf of the insurer), the plaintiffs-respondents, and the
278. Rush Prudential,536 U.S. at 360.
279. Id. at 361.
280. Id.at 362.
281. Id. at 387 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 236 (2000)).
282. See http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/argument transcripts/021845.pdf (transcript of March 23, 2004 oral argument) [hereinafter Oral Argument].
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol13/iss2/6
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Texas attorney general (arguing on behalf of the respondents). As
expected, much of the questioning focused on the distinction between
benefits determinations and medical treatment.
There was considerable focus on the Texas statute that permitted claims
against managed care entities. Additional arguments, relating to section
502(a) and Pilot Life, were primarily limited to the context of the Texas
statute and whether Texas could create a cause of action that survived
ERISA. The justices essentially collapsed the merits questions with the
jurisdictional issues and, unlike the complete preemption arguments,
conflict preemption pursuant to section 514 was only cursorily addressed.
Commenting on the argument that the Texas statute falls within the
insurance savings clause of section 514 because the benefit denial was the
equivalent of practicing medicine and therefore not preempted, Justice
28 3 Clearly, as
Souter stated, "[i]t seems to me an irrational logical leap.
demonstrated in Pappas, there can be a matter that addresses the
substantive issues pertaining to medical necessity decision-making without
a jurisdictional question pursuant to section 502(a).
The failure to fully address section 514 highlights the potential problem
with the Court's selection of Calad and Davila. Although significant
portions of the argument addressed the decision-making process and the
delivery of health care services, as noted, much of the discussion was
devoted to section 502(a) and the Texas statute. On the contrary, Cicio
would, presumably, have been a better vehicle to address the full range of
ERISA issues since the Second Circuit had determined both complete and
conflict preemption. Furthermore, some of the Court's questions were
about whether the plaintiff should have paid for what had been requested, in
one case the drug Vioxx, and subsequently sought reimbursement under
ERISA. A case with a limited expenditure of money by a beneficiary of a
plan, such as the payment for a drug, could easily obscure the reality of
many of the struggles of modem day health care when the requested
treatment is prohibitively expensive. A consideration of a case with a
limited financial exposure might lead to the conclusion that ERISA is
adequate to address all utilization review conflict. However, the situation in
Cicio, where the decedent needed treatment that might have cost as much as
$150,000, a sum which he and his family could not have obtained,
highlights the real problem of perceiving ERISA as the sole mechanism
operating to enforce patients' rights. Unfortunately, the oral argument did
not address such cases.
The justices were also interested in the issue of how medical necessity
decisions might define the basic standards of medical care. This raises a
283.

Oral Argument, supra note 282, at *28.
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clear state law issue. If the Court decides to end ERISA preemption
(meaning both complete and, necessarily, conflict preemption), and allows
these claims to be pursued in state court under medical malpractice law,
what will be their fate? It is not at all clear whether the causes of action
may be able to proceed. A variety of issues and potential defenses to these
medical malpractice claims are available, including the issues of whether
state statutory law would allow such claims, the impact of the ban on the
corporate practice of medicine, whether the health care coverage is only a
contract not allowing tort recovery, and whether there is a relationship
between either the plan and the patient or the medical personnel and the
patient to establish a duty of care for the purposes of a medical malpractice
claim. These issues will surely be ones of first impression in most states
and will, in many ways, force states to come to terms with changes in the
health care system.
Although the law pertaining to managed care liability is uncertain, one
thing remains clear. This area of the law will remain challenging and
unsettled for a long time, offering attorneys exciting opportunities to assist
in the shaping of the health care system.
V. CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court now has the opportunity to finally settle
questions about what rights individuals have in holding their insurers and
health plans responsible for decision-making regarding care that their
doctors have determined is necessary. The Supreme Court is presently
reviewing two cases that pertain to ERISA and the decision may clarify an
area of the law which has become quite unsettled, and one in which there
are many claims of dramatic injustice. The cases which the Court has
selected hint that there may not be a complete resolution of the issue, with
only one area of preemption resolved. However, if the Supreme Court
decides both preemption issues and ends ERISA dismissal of claims about
wrongful utilization review decisions, it is quite unclear whether those
claims can succeed on their merits in state court.
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